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Weimar Migrations: Katherine Anne
Porter in Berlin
Joseph Kuhn
 
Introduction: Weimar Berlin and Porter’s “Plan” For Her
Fiction
1 In the spring of 1931 Katherine Anne Porter, then living in Mexico and already the
author  of  the  classic  short  story  “Flowering  Judas”  (1930),  won  a  Guggenheim
fellowship and set sail for France on a German liner. Quite by chance—the difficulty was
that she could not obtain a visa for France en route—Porter ended up not taking the
usual Lost Generation route to Paris, but sailing all the way to Weimar Germany and
living in Berlin between September 1931 and January 1932. Unbidden and unwanted,
this short stay became the black swan event in Porter’s literary career. Brief and bleak
as it was, it arguably had a greater role in shaping her fiction—and the way that she
reread her fiction up to that point—than did her longer stays in Mexico or France (she
went on to live between 1932 and 1936 in Paris).1 It was not only that the ocean voyage
and the subsequent stay in a Berlin lodging house provided the germinative sources,
respectively, of her two Weimar fictions: the short story “The Leaning Tower” (1941)
and her  only  novel  Ship  of  Fools  (1962).  It  was  also  that,  as  she  pointed out  in  her
introduction to Flowering Judas and Other Stories (1940), Porter could relate the entire
body of her fiction to the idea of a European crisis—the crisis that was concentrated on
the demise of the German liberal state in the early 1930s (before Hitler’s chancellorship
of January 1933). In the preface to the volume she observes that these stories in the
1940 collection (none of them set directly in Germany) are “fragments of a much larger
plan which I am still engaged in carrying out.” This plan, which she formed during the
“slowly darkening decade” of the 1930s, sought to “grasp the meaning” of “the heavy
threat  of  world catastrophe,”  to “trace” it  to  its  “sources” and to “understand” its
“logic” (Porter, 2008 717-18). This essay will try to explain why Porter’s short stay in
Weimar Germany had such an impact on her fiction and why it was able to provide her
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with an overarching “plan” for her entire literary output. For Porter, expatriation was
a  dominant  literary  figure,  but  where  she  differed  from  most  of  her  American
contemporaries in the period of the Lost Generation is that her variety of transatlantic
modernism was attuned to the politics of interwar Europe: to the supplanting of the
nineteenth-century liberal state by a new type of mass politics.2 In her sensitivity to the
political shape of modernity Porter should rather be placed in relation to the Weimar
thinker,  Hannah  Arendt,  who  took  the  inverse  trip  from  Berlin  to  the  American
continent and whose expatriate writing was likewise molded by the crisis years of the
1930s. 
2 Porter and Arendt: isn’t this a mismatch? Arendt was a Weimar Jewish philosopher,
who subsequently belonged to the radical group of New York intellectuals, and if she is
compared with any American fiction writer it is usually with another member of this
group,  her  friend  Mary  McCarthy.  On  the  other  hand,  Porter  was  a  self-educated
southern  fiction  writer  whose  family  were  Texan farmers  and  she  hated  German
philosophy. Yet Porter and Arendt have a counterintuitive affinity that is  based on
their oddly analogous responses as literary migrants to the totalitarian “catastrophe”
of interwar Europe. In reaction to this crisis each of them worked out a woman writer’s
way of being a modernist and wrote in a hard, juridical style that insisted on restoring
responsibility to the modern self.3 
 
Ship of Fools: Late Weimar Germany and “Negative”
Evil 
3 What exactly was this “larger plan” of Porter’s? Porter’s remark about tracing events to
“sources” suggested that she saw a historically-conditioned, psychological structure at
the origin of the “catastrophe”: to use her language, it was the secret complicity of
“good people” in acts of evil (Porter, 1987 67).4 This psychological structure is set forth
by Dr. Schumann in Ship of Fools: “Our collusion with evil is only negative, consent by
default you might say. I suppose in our hearts our sympathies are with the criminal
because he really commits the deeds we only dream of doing!” (Porter, 1962 294). The
structure operates in the passengers on the Vera,  the German ship that crosses the
Atlantic  from  Veracruz  to  Bremerhaven,  a  ship  that  is  evidently  an  allegorical
representation of the late Weimar state. Despite a very liberal constitution, by 1931 the
Weimar Republic was being undermined by proto-totalitarian movements on the right
and the left. The man at the helm of the ship of state, the monarchist Captain Thiele, is
akin to the conservative nationalists, President Hindenburg and Chancellor Brüning,
who were the heads of state in Germany when Porter was visiting Berlin. Captain Thiele
is prevailed upon by the radical nationalists—the proto-Nazi characters, Hans Rieber
and Lizzi Spöckenkieker—to expel Wilhelm Freytag from the Captain’s table because
Freytag is  married to a  Jewish woman. What Porter called her “parable of  political
action” in this novel is one in which the traditional right represented by figures such as
Hindenburg is outmanoeuvred by the radical right (who in 1933 used Weimar laws of
the state of emergency to create a totalitarian system) (Porter, 1990 501). In the novel,
as in the last three Weimar governments, the conservative and the radical right share
enough  common  ground  in  anti-semitism  and  a  reliance  on  a  strong,  extra-legal
executive to make this alliance possible. The late Weimar state is what Dr. Schumann
calls “collusion” writ large. 
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4 In Ship of Fools, Porter orchestrates two parallel levels of action. There is the allegorical
figure of the Weimar ship of state, mediated through Sebastian Brant’s Das Narrenschiff
(1494), in which the voyage toward the “mystic Fatherland” is also that of Brant’s ship
toward Narragonia, the paradise of fools (Porter, 1962 40). Then within this allegorical
figure, and calibrated to its schema of decline, Porter sets off a series of interactions
between the individual travelers, many of which exemplify “negative” evil. 
5 To the central event—the “Freytag crisis” (Porter, 1962 244)—Porter subtends a number
of  analogous  examples  of  “collusion,”  such as  Herr  Glocken’s  refusal  to  report  the
thievery  of  the  zarzuela  company  in  the  shops  of  Tenerife.  These  examples  seem
apparently quite minor in comparison to the political gravity of the Freytag case, and
this impression of slightness is confirmed in some of the examples of “collusion” from
the 1940 collection Flowering Judas and Other Stories. For example, in the story “Theft”
(1929), the nameless protagonist, a single woman in her late thirties, allows herself to
be taken advantage of in a series of everyday infringements, including the theft of her
purse by a janitress; but although the janitress and her devilish eyes make a convenient
external source of evil, the woman-protagonist realizes that it is she who, through her
moral inertia, is the responsible party, the “thief” of herself (Porter, 2008 71). Porter’s
focus on the marginal, everyday event can perhaps be seen as the personalistic mode of
fiction  associated  with  women  writers.  As  Porter  famously  put  it:  “my  fiction  is
reportage, only I do something to it” (Givner 206). But such attention to minor details is
also her distinctly literary way of indicating how pretotalitarian government manifests
itself in the interstices of everyday life.5
 
Porter and Competing Styles of Transatlantic
Modernism 
6 Porter is an unusual case in interwar literary migration in that her distinctly juridical
imagination fixes upon Weimar Berlin as the epicenter of post-Versailles Europe rather
than the Paris of  Hemingway, Fitzgerald,  Stein and Eugene Jolas.  She insisted upon
putting  the  modernity  of  the  state  at  the  heart  of  her  aesthetic  modernism—in
particular  she  dramatized  the  way  in  which  in  the  early  twentieth  century  liberal
governments such as those of the Weimar state and that of President Wilson in the
United  States  in  1918  turned  into  constitutional  dictatorships.6 In  “The  Wooden
Umbrella”  (1947),  her  demolition of  Gertrude Stein,  Porter  dismissed the  colony of
American expatriates who gathered around Stein as being blind to “a falling world” and
divided  them  up  into  two  parties:  “those  who  were  full  of  an  active,  pragmatic
unbelief” (she meant Hemingway and Fitzgerald) and those, such as Eugene Jolas, “who
searched  their  own  vitals  and  fished  up  strange  horrors  in  the  style  of  transition”
(Porter, 2008 560). “The Wooden Umbrella” is a reminder that, as a literary traveler to
post-Versailles Europe, Porter was at the forefront of an international movement of
competing modernisms, selecting and synthesizing among them. In the main she was in
the line of the formal, traditionalist modernism of the Southern New Critics: she saw
herself as a disciple of Henry James and as such spoke for the “conscious, disciplined
artist” (Porter, 2008 702). Porter’s adherence to the formal control of the unconscious
lay behind her quarrel  with Eugene Jolas’  transition.  Although Porter had published
“Magic” (1928) and “The Jilting of Granny Weatherall” (1929) in this most experimental
of transatlantic little magazines, she came increasingly to detach herself from Jolas’
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expressionist poetics.7 In some unpublished notes, probably from the early part of the
Second World War, Porter observed a parallel between Fascism and the experimental
avant-garde (her examples are Joyce, Stein, and the surrealists) in that both Fascism
and the avant-garde turned away from “the use of reason” to “myth and sleep”: “Hitler
is Surrealism in action, applied to politics” (McKeldin library, qtd. in Brinkmeyer 215).
 
Hannah Arendt: Porter’s Weimar Twin? 
7 Porter’s emphasis on the centrality of the modern state in her transatlantic modernism
brings  her  into  proximity  with  another  group  of  interwar  migrants:  the  German
intellectuals  who left  the Third Reich for  the United States.  At  the same time that
Porter was in Berlin another peripatetic young woman, Hannah Arendt, was also living
in  the  city  and  working  on  her  habilitation  project  on  Rahel  Varnhagen,  after
completing her doctorate on Love and Saint Augustine (1928). In 1933, however, she was
forced to leave Hitler’s  Germany,  and by 1941 ended up in the United States.  Both
Arendt and Porter were interwar peregrini  who were drawn to Saint Augustine as a
philosophical  source  of  their  thinking  about  travel  (to  each  woman  travel  had  its
existential roots in the interwar loss of a co-habitable world and it spatially measured
out the exile of the migrant from a transcendent point of origin).8 Each could say that
their  “bent”  was  “to  the  Left”  (Porter,  2008  1008),  although  each  had  a  streak  of
traditionalist elitism (of a southern plantocratic type in Porter’s or of a Hellenophile in
Arendt’s);  this  unquantifiable  streak  could  puzzle  their  liberal  colleagues—as  it  did
when both opposed desegregation of schooling in the South in the 1950s (Porter, 1987
39-40;  Arendt,  2003  193-213).  Their  imaginations  took  shape  around  the  “world
catastrophe” of interwar Germany; later in the early 1960s they both were drawn into
the acrimonious first public debates about the Holocaust through the critical reaction
of the New York intellectuals (who were often of Jewish descent) to their two works:
Ship of Fools in 1962 and Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1963. In these books Porter and Arendt
saw the political evil of their historical time not as a demonic force but as something
commonplace and widely distributed—“negative” evil in Porter’s description, the
“banality of evil” in Arendt’s (Arendt, 2006 250). 
8 The novel element in Porter and Arendt’s assessment was that it saw evil not so much
as a presence as a lack, a puzzling withholding of the activity of thought in moral
predicaments. This banal evil is very different from classical conceptions of evil.  As
Porter’s Dr. Schumann says, “it takes a strong character to be really evil” and “most of
us are too slack, halfhearted, or cowardly” (Porter, 1962 294). This “strong character,”
according to Arendt, was certainly not in Eichmann, who did not have the depth in evil
found in such classical villains as Iago: “It was rather sheer thoughtlessness […] that
predisposed him to become one of the greatest criminals of that period” (Arendt, 1968
287-288).  This  focus  on  banality  or  “slack”  (which  might  be  Porter’s  synonym  for
banality) caused both authors to be harshly reprimanded by many of their first critics,
such as Theodore Solotaroff and Lionel Abel, for refusing to see an “active evil” in the
work  of  the  Nazis  and  allegedly  replacing  this  with  an  aesthetic  distaste  for  the
triteness of their evildoers (Solotaroff 143).9 
9 For Arendt, the central cause of the interwar crisis was the withdrawal of the citizenry
from the polis, the public space where the vita activa necessary to human dignity could
be exercised (Arendt,  1998 198-199).  Porter,  who was not a political  philosopher by
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education,  nevertheless came to a parallel  insight to Arendt’s  and showed it  at  the
concrete level of composition because the action of Porter’s stories is often organized
around public, collective structures: ocean liner (Ship of Fools), Berlin boarding house
(“The Leaning Tower”), hacienda (in the story of that name), and hospital (“Pale Horse,
Pale Rider”).  These are places where citizens are brought together,  willy-nilly,  in a
common world,  but from which each retreats into a form of inwardness or private
existence. Porter says, for example, of the passengers embarking on the German vessel
in Veracruz: “This common predicament did not by any means make of them fellow
sufferers. On the contrary, each chose to maintain his pride and separateness within
himself” (Porter, 1962 11). This “pride and separateness” has many manifestations: that
of  the  ethnic  solidarity  of  the  Captain’s  table  after  the  expulsion of  Freytag  or,  in
personal  interactions,  in  the  tendency  of  couples  such  as  Jenny  and  David  or  the
German families such as the Huttens and Baumgartners to form islands of sentiment,
the equivalent of this tribal identification in the individual life. 
 
“The Leaning Tower”: Berlin as Phantasma and the
Northern Renaissance 
10 In Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) the central reason for the rise of the
totalitarian state is the emergence of apolitical and “superfluous” mass communities in
Europe after the First World War. But this is abetted by the retreat of the bourgeois into
“private life” and their temporary reliance on the “mob” to conduct government on
their behalf (Arendt, 1958 338, 124). In Porter’s Weimar fiction “The Leaning Tower”
there is also a withdrawal from the polis by the middle classes. The story concerns the
stay of the young Texan painter, Charles Upton, in Berlin during the final days of 1931
at a time when Chancellor Brüning was imposing a strong deflationary policy as a way
out  of  the  Depression,  a  policy  that  spared large  businesses,  but  cut working class
incomes. Porter gets this shrinking liquidity into the story—every act of buying and
selling on the part of small hoteliers and shopkeepers is a desperate one. There is no
explicit mention in the story of the chief threat to the Weimar republic from the right,
the  National  Socialists  (they  had  become  a  sizeable  minority—106  seats—in  the
Reichstag after the September 1930 elections). Instead Porter shows the descent of a
dark mood on Charles, which flickers out in such expressionistic details as the white
worms that wriggle out of the sausage he is served at the hotel. The mood is also a
temporal one, as though for Charles the possibility of the future has been cut off. By the
end of the story there is a stultification of the forward sense of time as Charles is left in
the pension house on New Year’s day in 1932 feeling the dying of the liberal state in his
very bones, a dying which he senses as something “threatening […] hanging over his
head” (Porter, 2008 511). 
11 The story focuses on Charles’s stay at Rosa Riechl’s pension house, which becomes a
microcosm of social relations in Germany. Towards the end of the story Charles attends
a New Year’s Eve party with the student lodgers, Hans Gehring, who has a duelling scar,
and the mathematician Otto Bussen. Each of them breaks out into the pan-Germanist
views of the so-called conservative revolution in Weimar. Hans tells Charles that “pure
power is what counts to a nation or a race”: such crude concepts of government as
power  were,  according  to  Arendt,  the  result  of  the  nationalists’  importation  of
imperialistic concepts of colonial rule back into Europe (Porter, 2008 502; Arendt, 1998
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138, 155). But more insidious than the students’ frank politics of violence is the attitude
of  Rosa,  the  landlady with  the  “foxy  smile,”  who makes  a  special  favorite  of  Hans
(Porter, 2008 510). With her plush and her feather beds, Rosa exemplifies a middle-class
anxiety over insecure status that has turned inward and refuses to engage the political
world.  In  a  letter  written  in  October  1933,  Porter  commented that  “the  suffocated
middle-classes” in Germany felt they were “slip[ping] into the proletarian class” and
fell back on the Nazis because they thought that this party would save “the plush on
their chairs” (Porter, 2012 116-7).10 The attitude of the middle class is objectified in the
clambering cupids that Charles observes on the roof opposite his room, which keep up
their “senseless play” and “wanton” vulgarity even in the snow and rain (Porter, 2008
462). It is as though they are trying to freeze the “eternity” of middle class sentiment as
a permanent attitude regardless of the withering circumstances of the Depression.11
The central symbol of the story, the statuette of the leaning tower of Pisa, points to the
precariousness  of  this  hope.  Rosa  proudly  exhibits  this  souvenir  in  memory of  her
marriage  and  it  is  inadvertently  broken by  Charles  on  his  first  visit.  The  souvenir
captures Rosa’s forlorn southern nostalgia for Italy, a forlornness that comes out of her
sense  that  the  middle-class  world  of  the  Wilhelmine  period  and  its  Mediterranean
honeymoons has slipped away. 
12 The narrative dynamic is that of Charles’s slow absorption of the political stasis of late
Weimar Berlin. He comes with a nineteenth-century romantic image of Germany as
castles in the mist, derived from his childhood friend Kuno, but by the end of the story
he comes to absorb the peculiar temporal mood of modern Berlin, its inability to open
into a liveable future. He is left in a curled up, fetal position, refusing to be born into
the new year: he cannot “think clearly” and feels “an infernal desolation of the spirit,
the chill and the knowledge of death in him” (Porter, 2008 511).
13 Porter makes Charles an artist because this profession means that, like herself when
she was in Berlin, he is forced to size up the Weimar crisis in terms of representational
form. Charles tells himself that this city “is not right” for painters: “There’s something
wrong with the shapes, or the light, or something” (Porter, 2008 455). In trying to show
this “something wrong with the shapes,” Porter strategically uses an expressionist style
to mark the intrusion of the unconscious into the rational sphere of the political. For
example, she says: “The darkness closed over the strange city like the great fist of an
enemy who had survived in full strength, a voiceless monster from a prehuman, older
and colder and grimmer time of the world” (Porter, 2008 472). In such a description
Porter temporarily adopts the night language of Eugene Jolas, who had initially acted as
her guide to literary Berlin in 1931.12 She seems indeed to be citing, with her own slant,
Jolas’s  remark  that  “Nothing  can  ever  destroy  in  [man]  the  immense  night  of  the
prehistoric”  (“Literature  and  the  New  Man”  [1930])  (Jolas  263).  This  expressionist
image of the “fist” in Porter shows how in Berlin disorder and poverty seem to have
moved into a state of ontological or archaic permanence. At times Charles appears to
think that some of the German characters in their rigidity belong to this archaic state.
When confronted with Hans’s pride in his duelling wound Charles is baffled—he cannot
comprehend the satisfaction in self-mutilation that in his home state of Texas would be
regarded  as  the  shameful  evidence  of  a  street  fight.  In  Germany  such  wounds  are
exhibited with an “arrogance” that comes from some inner primitive certainty, “the
mysterious place where Hans really lived” (Porter, 2008 479). 
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14 Such descriptions might suggest that interwar Germany is for Porter only the irrational
Other, coded with an emotive surplus as in the scene of the shoppers in “a trance of pig
worship” before the confectionery pigs (Porter, 2008 458). Certainly Porter is known for
her anti-Germanism. But the model of “collusion”—her belief that “none of us has any
real alibi in this world”—also applies to the American visitor (Porter, 2012 183). Charles
as visiting American is both benefactor and late enemy, both “the rich American who
pays the rent for all of us” in Tadeusz Mey’s description (Porter, 2008 482) and a citizen
of a country that, as Rosa and Hans Gehring remind him, brought about the final defeat
of Germany in the last war. Behind Charles stand the American politicians and bankers
who in an economic game of hot and cold with Germany supported German payment of
reparations,  then  invested  in  the  Weimar  boom  between  1924  and  1928,  and  then
withdrew short-term loans to Germany in 1929. 
15 Charles’s insensitivity as an American benefactor is summed up in the episode of his
coat,  a  would-be  gift  to  the  impoverished  Herr  Bussen.  Tadeusz  Mey,  the  Polish
boarder, advises against this gift, saying that Bussen will feel Charles’s “contempt” in
his  act  of  generosity  and  will  only  respond  with  hatred.  Thinking  perhaps  of  the
examples  of  Dawes,  Young  and  Hoover—American  politicians  who  wanted  to  give
financial aid to defeated Germany between 1924 and 1931—Tadeusz says “you
Americans have some very odd notions. Why all this benevolence?” “If you set yourself
up  as  a  benefactor,”  Tadeusz  says,  “you  must  expect  to  be  hated”  (Porter,  2008
490-491). In unconscious ways Charles’s relationship to Bussen, even as he feels pity for
him, is predatory and he imagines Bussen’s indebtedness as a late medieval scene on a
par with the emblematic allegory of Holbein and Sebastian Brant, German artists Porter
admired. He sees Hans Bussen fleeing like a stag across snowy wastes, with he, Hans,
Tadeusz and Rosa bringing him down by the throat like hunting dogs and this with the
contradictory aim of giving him “aid and comfort” (Porter, 2008 492). 
16 Porter  published  “The  Leaning  Tower”  in  the  New  Critical  mainstay,  The  Southern
Review, which was edited by Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren. Nevertheless, it is
not quite enough to say that the story only demonstrates her New Critical aesthetic of
Jamesian control. In the story,  and in another story published in the journal,  “Pale
Horse,  Pale  Rider,”  it  is  evident  that  new  forms  of state  power  (seen  in  the
constitutional  dictatorships  in  Weimar  Germany and in  the  wartime United States)
intrude into Porter’s poised prose and threaten to unbalance it. This is explicit in “Pale
Horse,  Pale  Rider,”  the  last  story  in  the  autobiographical  Miranda  series,  in  which
Porter’s protagonist,  Miranda Gay, falls ill  during the influenza epidemic in the last
days of the Great War. Her hallucinations during her illness incorporate her recent
encounters with the Wilson security state of 1918 and its Liberty Bond promoters, but
they  do  so  in  a  wild  and  expressionistic  style  in  which  her  inner  voice  becomes
incoherent (for example, she dreams of the German doctor in the hospital as a well
poisoner and baby murderer). Porter’s compositional problem is to be both within this
dream state and to register it rationally. “The Leaning Tower” shows Porter searching
for  another  way,  apart  from expressionism and surrealism,  of  understanding these
phantasmal images in the Weimar landscape; as a result, she goes back to a completely
different tradition in pre-modern Europe than that of T.S. Eliot and his liking for Dante
and  the  Latin  countries.  She  found  this  different  tradition, that  of  the  Northern
Renaissance,  while  staying in Basel  in 1932,  shortly  after  the Berlin trip,  when she
began to read Erasmus and Sebastian Brant. For what the hunting scene shows is that
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Porter  sometimes  uses  a  hallucinatory  register  that  incorporates  the  late  medieval
allegorism of Holbein and Dürer. This is a moral understanding of the night that is
distinct from the understanding of romantic-expressionism: Charles discovers a truth
about himself in his dream; he does not submerge himself in irrationalism. In one of his
early  walks  around  Berlin  Charles  confronts  the  “skull  of  famine”  of  a  young
unemployed man on the street. He secretly sketches the man in hard Düreresque lines;
these are the lines of Porter’s own style as it turns from a documentary or sociological
record  toward  a  Northern  Renaissance  art  of  mortality,  exemplified  by  Holbein’s
“Dance of Death”. Because the man is so emaciated “his teeth stood out in ridges under
the mottled tight skin of his cheeks” (Porter, 2008 456). He becomes a baroque auto-
graphic of himself and etches out the outline of his skull by using his own famished
skin as paper. Modern Berlin is seen through a religious-humanist dimension of truth
and the symbolism of the mortal that goes with it—a dimension that originates in an
older,  pre-secular  Germany.  These images might  seem expressionistic,  but  they are
allegorical in the manner of the Northern Renaissance writers.
 
Porter and Arendt: Responsibility and Judgment in
Dark Times
17 Porter  returned to her  fictionalization of  Weimar Germany in Ship  of  Fools,  a  novel
whose  schema  of  the  fool  as  traveler  was  derived  from  Sebastian  Brant’s  Das
Narrenschiff.  The  outline  of  this  novel  was  already  available  to  Porter  in  1931  in  a
journal that she wrote on the voyage, but it took thirty years to put together and it was
therefore shaped by the whole post-Second World War question of how it was possible
for citizens of a modern European state to carry out the genocide of peoples. It is in Ship
of Fools that Porter’s proximity to Arendt, the Weimar exile, comes particularly close: it
was  Arendt’s  Eichmann book that  made the  American reading  public  aware  of  the
subjects  of  guilt  and responsibility  in  the Second World War,  subjects  that  became
pressing in America in the early 1960s after some fifteen years of discussion of the
Holocaust (at least, as Peter Novick argues in The Holocaust in American Life [1999], as a
specifically  ethnic  crime  against  the  Jewish  people).  It  is  just  these  questions  of
responsibility  that  Porter  raises  in  her  novel,  which  appeared  a  year  before  the
publication of Arendt’s book. In her writings from 1945 onwards Arendt had sharply
distinguished  guilt  from  responsibility:  guilt  was  a  private  feeling  of  wrong,  while
responsibility was a public  category and one which involved being answerable to a
specific legal charge (King 25-42). Porter also tried to bring her characters in Ship of
Fools under the legal category of judgment, and she seemed to share Arendt’s suspicion
of guilt as a loose feeling that could easily slide into empathy with the accused. The
professor’s  wife  in  the  novel,  Frau  Hutten,  undoubtedly  speaks  with  Porter’s  voice
when  she  says  that  “we  have  lost  our  sense  of  justice”  because  of  a  “sentimental
dishonesty” about the offender (Porter, 1962 295). Most of the first critics of Ship of Fools
missed this juristic aspect in Porter’s narrative voice. One critic, Theodore Solotaroff in
Commentary, indeed accused Porter of projecting a vague sense of collective guilt over
all her characters on the vessel—Germans, Jews, Spaniards and Americans—and seeing
them  all  as  equally  damnable,  all  on  a  highway  to  hell  (for  Solotaroff,  whose
grandfather was an Odessa Jew,  this  allowed the specific  crimes of  Germans in the
Third Reich to  be  diffused in  the general  culpability  of  the human).  In  Solotaroff’s
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opinion the novel’s repetitive structure showed that the characters cannot change, and
this  demonstrated the author’s  “misanthropy” (Solotaroff  149).  Such arguments got
under the skin of Porter because they diminished the role she saw for responsible self-
reflection in her characters. Porter sets the reflectiveness of Dr. Schumann, Jenny, Herr
Glocken and even Wilhelm Freytag against the spread of “negative” evil on the ship.
For example,  after  La Condesa has disembarked,  Dr.  Schumann has a  lightning-like
perception of his “guilty love” for her, of his supplying her with sedatives and kissing
her when she is in a narcotic trance. He subsequently resolves not to be “a coward”
(Porter,  1962  373).  Dr.  Schumann  thus  becomes  an  exponent  of  that  Socratic  self-
examination that Arendt called judgment, a two-in-oneness that is able to resist the
fungus-like expansion of evil by seeing oneself from outside, from the standpoint of
another.  Dr.  Schumann  here  mediates  Porter’s  own  authorial  position  of  objective
distance, a distance that is always judging and assessing her characters in a quasi-legal
way. For Porter, this authorial act of judgment was “the most important thing in any
book”  (Porter,  2012  195)  and  its  perceived  absence,  for  example,  in  the  works  of
William Faulkner,  was  why she  regarded novels  such as  Sanctuary,  with  their  non-
judgmental immersion in evil, as the antithesis of her own fiction. Faulkner, she told
her students in the 1950s, “does not want to think” (Givner 392). 
18 Arendt observed that  what was striking about Eichmann was “an inability to think,
namely, to think from the standpoint of somebody else” (italics in original) (Arendt,
1968 49). The thinking that Arendt had in mind was not thinking through ideas or even
thinking  with  moral  concepts.  She  had  too  much  evidence  of  how  her  friends  in
Germany easily reversed their humanist ideas and moralities in the early days of the
Third Reich and coordinated themselves with the new government—as though all they
were changing was a set of table manners. Porter likewise shows how Professor Hutten,
a  professional  representative  of  the  German  mind,  quickly  accommodates  himself
within the Captain’s tightening “ring” of “blood and sympathy” that excludes Freytag,
even though the professor had in an earlier discussion exposed the fictional biology of
racial  thought  (Porter,  1962  247).  Instead  of  finding  a  point  of  anchorage  against
banality in ideas or norms, Arendt found this point in the faculty of judgment: the
ability  to  stop  and  reflect  on  particular  relevant  examples.  She  felt  the  faculty  of
judgment  was  called  for  particularly  “in  times  of  crisis”  and  that  it  is  “the  most
political of man’s mental abilities” (Arendt, 2003 104, 188). Both Porter and Arendt—
exhibiting a similar coldness—saw that the faculty of judgment had to set itself apart
from pity or emotionalism because this served to dissolve the moral distinctness of
actions. The dangers of pity are evident. Just before his “lightning stroke” of reflection
in Ship of Fools Dr. Schumann feels that his “guilty love” draws him into a “wallow of
compassion for every suffering thing” so that “he could no longer tell the difference
between […] the violator and the violated” (Porter, 1962 372).
19 In the Kantian scheme that  Arendt draws upon,  the reflective or  legal  judgment is
similar to the aesthetic sensibility because each focuses on a singular object without
subsuming  it  under  a  general  concept.  That  is  to  say,  aesthetic  judgement  is  an
immediate response, like that of the sensation of taste, and it bypasses the processes of
cognition  and  moral  reasoning  because  in  these  latter  cases  the  object  under
consideration  is  indeed  subsumed  into  a  general  law.  But  even  though  taste  is  an
absolutely individual response, Arendt lays much emphasis on Kant’s argument that
the aesthetic judgment is also outer-directed because it appeals to the agreement of
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others who also make their own judgments in taste about the object. Another point
about the aesthetic judgment for Arendt is that it allows the perceiver to see the world
in all of its newness and thick particularity. This places the community of receptive
selves not  only in a  kind of  cosmopolitan mini-state but also within a co-habitable
planet  or  ecology.  It  is  curious  that  in  Ship  of  Fools  the  only  moment  when  the
passengers are “cleansed of death and violence” is when they observe the aesthetic
splendor  of  three  whales  swimming  alongside  their  vessel.  Even  the  twins  of  the
Spanish dancers, Ric and Rac, who are the apparent incarnations of a radical evil, break
out  in  “pure  ecstasy”:  “Whales,  whales,  whales,  whales!”  (Porter,  1962  329).  For  a
moment  all  of  the  passengers  are  united  as  a  community  of  spectators  around  a
purposeless object of beauty. They become connected to what Kant called an “enlarged
mentality,”  one  that  is  consistent  with  a  universal  or  cosmopolitan  viewpoint  and
thereby  potentially  resistant  to  the  thoughtlessness  of  evil  (Arendt,  1977,  location
7972). It is evident that this “enlarged mentality” could prevent the pre-totalitarian
drift  in  Porter’s  passengers  and  in  political  terms  correlates  with  institutional
structures of liberalism that are able to secure a civic plurality. For both Arendt and
Porter these structures were quintessentially found in the structures created by the
Founding Fathers (Arendt in On Revolution [1963] and Porter in “Act of Faith: 4 July
1942”). 
20 How might this aesthetic judgement work in Porter’s fictional practice? In both of the
Weimar  works  Porter  often  shows  her  characters  in  a  process  of  mental  weaving
around the singular object. At the end of “The Leaning Tower” this activity is especially
foregrounded with the reappearance in Charles’s room of the statuette of the tower of
Pisa; it is now repaired and stored safely behind glass, away from his clumsy fingers.
The tower,  as  was  said  earlier,  relates  to  the  fragile  Weimar nexus  of  middle-class
German  sentiment  and  Porter  perhaps  suggests  that  it  has  now  found  a  way  of
shielding itself from further breakage (its alliance with “pure power”). Its reappearance
puts Charles on the spot, insisting on its aesthetic triteness, and his reflective judgment
begins to work or, as Arendt puts it, “go visiting”: “Well, what? […] What had the silly
little thing reminded him of before? There was an answer if he could think what it was,
but this was not the time.” So Charles’s reflection in his drunken haze gets arrested,
even though his need to “go visiting” is at this historical moment “terribly urgent”
(Arendt, 1992 43; Porter, 2008 511). 
21 There  are  similar  objects  of  potential  reflection  in  Ship  of  Fools:  the  whales,  the
sculptural body of the drowned woodcarver, the sodden form of the Huttens’ bulldog
that he selflessly rescues. In addition, Porter, through the rotational interactions of the
characters,  creates a potential  version of an intersubjective community on the ship
although it  is  one that  keeps breaking down.  The characters  can voice penetrating
insights (for example, Dr. Schumann and Frau Hutten on “negative” evil) but they act
at  variance  with  these  insights  in  moments  of  crisis  (neither  character  objects  to
Freytag’s expulsion); they can speak versions of what Arendt calls the ideological logic
of “supersense” (Professor Hutten “was not interested in discussion, but in speaking his
own  thoughts  aloud  in  company”);  and  their  dialogues  are  often  more  defensive
assertions than they are reflections from the other’s point of view (Arendt, 1998 458;
Porter, 1962 289). An example of this last point is when Freytag meets Mrs. Treadwell—
the middle-aged divorcee who informed Lizzi of his wife’s Jewishness—and reproaches
her  for  the  “indifference”  and “boredom” that  prompted  this  betrayal  of  a  secret.
These remarks evidently make the Arendtian point about the banality of evildoing. But
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Freytag  is  himself  suspect:  not  only  is  he  as  racialist  as  any  anti-semite  about  his
German blood, but his indignation with Mrs. Treadwell is his stage manager’s way of
“enjoying the scene.” The pair’s reconciliation, facilitated by her drop into “shapeless”
empathy, is not genuine and it is as if they used words such as “friends” and “forgive”
as empty chips (Porter, 1962 257, 258, 262). The reader has to relativize all of these
positions within what Robert Penn Warren, in his classic essay “Irony with a Center:
Katherine  Anne Porter”  (1942),  called  a  “total  circumstantiality”  and work  out  the
moral “center” of these ironic relativizations (Warren 155). 
22 Many of the first critics of the novel misread this strategy of cold irony. Solotaroff
called  it  “misanthropy”  and  thought  that  Porter  was  laying  the  blame  for
contemporary disorder on the “stage Jew,” Herr Löwenthal (Solotaroff 149, 144). It is
Löwenthal  however  who  perspicuously  voices  what  is  perhaps  at  the  “center”  of
Porter’s accumulating perspectives: an insistence on human dignity. For Porter, as for
Arendt, the chief crime of totalitarian regimes was their attempts to strip away the
human  status  of  their  victims  and  make  them  things;  a  tampering  with  the
conservative  givens  of  human  nature.  Löwenthal  therefore  puts  forward  a  simple
human claim: “All he wanted in the world was the right to be himself, to go where he
pleased and do what  he wanted” (Porter,  1962 336).  In  a  letter  to  Julius  S.  Held,  a
German-American art historian, Porter affirms Löwenthal’s position: “I like him. He has
self-respect.”13
 
“Holiday” and the Biopolitical Community
23 To think in the “two-in-one” relation of Dr. Schumann is to have a dialogic relationship
to  an  outer  plurality  or,  put  differently,  to  the  intersubjective  space  of  co-judging
selves that is postulated in Kant’s aesthetics (as in the observation of the whales). But,
as Porter shows, this public and universal space constantly threatens to break away
into ethnic and personal partialities—Porter keeps showing how the passengers split
off into smaller units (including that of families such as the Baumgartners or of pairs of
lovers such as Jenny and David).  On the question of the quasi-organic partialism of
ethnic communities, notably that of the Captain’s table, it is pertinent here to refer to
one of Porter’s earliest stories, “Holiday,” begun in 1923 and finally published in 1960,
which, like her novel, depicts part of the early twentieth-century German diaspora on
the American continent  (it  is  set  in  Texas).  The story shows that  even at  the very
beginning  of  her  fictional  career  (when  she  had  published  just  two  stories  set  in
Mexico), Porter was already thinking about the moral dangers of fused communities,
particularly  German  ones,  although  she  did  not  directly  relate  them  yet  to
constitutional or totalitarian dictatorships. The narrator goes to stay with a German-
Texan farming family just before the First World War and she observes how their lives
are completely absorbed in the primary, cyclical activity of work. In this context it is
perhaps helpful to recall two categories of human activity that Arendt described in The
Human Condition (1958): action, or participation in a public space, and labor, a type of
act that is part of the life process and is fundamentally apolitical (it belongs to the
sphere Arendt calls the social). The Müller family are caught up in labor, that is in a
seasonal, repetitive process of farmwork, animal husbandry, childbirth, weddings and
so  on—activities  that  are  webbed  together  as  a  single  organic  process.  Porter
emphasizes the thoughtlessness of this cycle: “the almost mystical inertia of their [the
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Müllers’] minds in the midst of this muscular life” (Porter, 2008 432). To be such a homo
laborans might seem to be something archaic, but in Arendt’s analysis this is a very
modern condition, one central to the rise of the modern bio-political state because this
state bases itself on the supplanting of a public political sphere by the organic domain
of the social. The Müllers strike the narrator as “one human being divided into several
separate appearances” (Porter, 2008 431). 
24 In  this corporate  entity  there is,  the narrator  remarks,  only  one person who is  an
individual  and this  is  the daughter  Ottilie,  who after  a  childhood accident  lost  her
reasoning and has become the family servant. Ottilie has “been stripped of everything
but her mere existence” (Porter, 2008 442), and she resembles the pariah existences of
Herr Löwenthal the Jew and Herr Glocken the hunchback from Ship of Fools in her raw
biological being. She is a bio-political caesura in the mini-state of the Müller family. It
happens in the story that she is sustained by the supporting wholeness of her family,
but she might in other circumstances serve as a point of eugenic intervention. Ottilie
turns into the moral crux of the story: the narrator cannot forget her and feels held “to
our inescapable common source” by her (Porter, 2008 441). In the last scene of the story
the narrator and Ottilie absent themselves—their “holiday”—from the funeral train of
the matriarch Mrs.  Müller,  who suddenly  dies  and whose funeral  becomes another
addition  to  the  repetitive  organic  cycle.  With  their  cart  moving  “in  a  truly  broad
comedy swagger,” the narrator and Ottilie become “the fools of life”: they try to invest
the life principle with a joyous and different meaning from that of the homo laborans
(Porter, 2008 448-9). 
25 The “inescapable common source” that unites the narrator and Ottilie is perhaps the
fundamental ground of Porter’s fiction. For her, as for Arendt, it is goodness that has
roots (in contrast to the depthless nature of evil) and that has a deep place in memory.
There is a curious insistence in “Holiday” on the narrator remembering Ottilie “for the
rest of my life” while the Müllers “forgot her in pure self-defense” (Porter, 2008 441).
This insistence on the ethical value of memory as a bulwark against thoughtlessness is
also brought out in Arendt’s late work on responsibility and judgment: “For human
beings,  thinking of  past  matters means moving in the dimension of  depth,  striking
roots and thus stabilizing themselves, so as not to be swept away by whatever may
occur—the  Zeitgeist,  or  History  or  simple  temptation”  (Arendt,  2003  95).  Memory,
according to Arendt, is a way of reaching back to natality, that is the “new beginning”
that starts with the birth of each individual and which is referred to again with each
free action or judgment of that individual (Arendt, 1998 171). In her lectures on Kant’s
political philosophy Arendt explains that the “sociality” of free-judging aesthetic selves
has been there from the beginning of human association; “sociality” is an “origin” and
not  a  construction that  results  out  of  mutual  need (Arendt,  1991  74).  In  the  much
earlier Weimar work Love and Saint Augustine, however, Arendt prefers to trace natality
back  to  Saint  Augustine’s  theology  of  the  creation.14 This  is  another  point  of
congruence between Porter and Arendt. Their ethics of memory points to a common
derivation from Saint Augustine, who is the subject of Porter’s essay “St. Augustine and
the Bullfight” (1955). Both women writers acknowledge that turning backwards to the
“source” in Augustine’s philosophy (Arendt, 1996 50)—to the life-giving act of creation
—is a way of renewing and understanding experience, of turning random sensation into
knowledge or that which is informed by “truth” (without “truth,” Porter said in her
essay, showing here an Augustinian insight into her own migrations, travel was just
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“adventure”: “truth” forced her to confront her own contradictory joy in the Mexican
bullfight) (Porter, 2008 808). Porter and Arendt both mobilize Augustine’s thought to
counter  the  cruelty  of  their  times:  in  other  words  they  go  back  to  the  source,  to
natality,  rather  than  to  the  frequent  orientation  toward  death  found  in  Weimar
existentialism and the expressionist style.15 This orientation, most pertinently found in
Heidegger’s  notion  of  being-toward-death,  is  a  symptom  of  the  breakdown  of  the
liberal state into tribalisms and dark personal sensibilities. Without grounding in an
institutional structure guaranteeing plurality, this type of thought, which is located in
the isolated, existential self, has a particular occasion to flourish. It is fixated on its own
end and its own expressive complex of fear and desire around that end. When Charles
tries to think of the future, in the last paragraph of “The Leaning Tower,” he conceives
of it, in Heideggerian fashion, as a death’s head, the “chill and the knowledge of death”
(Porter, 2008 511).16 There are other politically pointed fantasies of death in Ship of Fools
such as when the Captain, an admirer of gangster films, imagines mowing down the
zarzuela company and “other people whom it was lawful to kill” with a machine gun
(Porter, 1962 427). Similar fantasies also play their role in the sexual life of those on
board. It is part of the Augustinian structure of Ship of Fools that all of the characters are
seeking a home to fill out their insufficiency of being, but they are often looking in the
wrong direction, most often looking toward a narrow erotic desire that must finally be
disappointed.  Like  Jenny  they  see  a  “death’s-head”  between  themselves  and  their
partner or like Dr.  Schumann mutter “Death,  death” in departing from La Condesa
(Porter, 1962 93, 369). Augustinian concepts of beginning again are a release from this
fixation on death. One of the few times that Jenny finds peace in the novel is when she
remembers  swimming with  the  porpoises  off  the  coast  of  Mexico,  connecting  with
natality and coming to a reconciliation with the spontaneity of nature that temporarily
stills her war with David.
26 What, to return to an earlier question, might explain the parallel minds of Porter and
Arendt? Both were mid-century migrants moving between the Americas and a “falling”
Europe (Porter, 2008 1016). Each used a style that many called one of “heartless malice”
to  counteract  the  banality  of  the  modern  self  and  reset  it  to  an  older,  more
conservative model of human nature (“heartless malice” is Porter’s description of how
one Jewish exile, Freytag’s wife Mary, might respond to the dullness of the Captain’s
table [Porter, 1962 335]). This made Porter and Arendt unpredictable combinations of
liberalism and conservatism; and it is probable that the Weimar background of Arendt
and the southern one of Porter helped to create this combination, particularly when
seen in contrast  to the more unquestioned progressivism of their  northern literary
colleagues.  What  fitted  this  liberal-conservative  combination  was  the  political
philosophy  of  Kant  or  perhaps,  more  precisely,  what  Arendt  constructs  as  this
philosophy. Kant was central to Arendt’s secular-Jewish beginnings in Weimar thought.
But he was also a philosophical influence on the Southern New Criticism with which
Porter was closely associated.  In “Criticism as Pure Speculation” (1941) John Crowe
Ransom,  Porter’s  favourite  poet,  brought  his  Kantian definition of  a  poem close  to
Porter’s central concerns when he said that: “A poem is, so to speak, a democratic state,
whereas  a  prose  discourse—mathematical,  scientific,  ethical,  or  practical  and
vernacular—is a totalitarian state.” Ransom observes that in a totalitarian state citizens
are “functional members” while in a democratic state they have “free exercise of their
private  and  independent  characters.”  In  this  trope  of  poem  as  state,  totalitarian
subjects are the equivalent of the logical paraphrase of the poem, its “structure,” while
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democratic subjects stand for “the particularity asserted by the parts in a poem” or its
“texture” (Ransom 137, 138). The main purpose of a poem is to reveal “texture,” the
unique qualities of the world as body. This is a Kantian distinction: it is the intellectual
judgment  that  takes  care  of  the  logical  statement  in  a  poem,  while  the  aesthetic
judgment comprehends the textural. Robert Penn Warren adopts Ransom’s model in
his essay “Irony with a Center: Katherine Anne Porter,” published in Ransom’s Kenyon
Review in  1942.  Implicit  in  Warren’s  notion of  irony as  diversity  of  viewpoints  is  a
Kantian  politics.  By  deploying  a  “delicate  balancing  of  rival  considerations”  and  a
“counterpoint of incident and implication,” Porter (Warren says) refuses “the straight
line,  the  formula,  through  the  material  at  hand”  (refuses,  that is,  its  reduction  to
scientific statement) (Warren 155). From both Porter’s and Warren’s perspective such a
view of  irony  is  congenial  to  a  southern,  Jeffersonian  localism trying  to  resist  the
incursions of a powerful twentieth-century state (the scientific state).
 
Conclusion 
27 In her 1940 preface Katherine Anne Porter observed that she was not one who “could
flourish in the conditions of the past two decades” because literature needs “a green
and growing world,” whereas she had had to find “order and form and statement” in
“grotesque dislocations” of  the political  body (Porter,  2008 717).  It  was her visit  to
Weimar  Berlin  over  1931  to  1932  that  compelled  her  to  take  account  of  the  post-
Versailles decline of  the liberal  state or,  to put the question in Arendt’s  existential
terms, the decomposition of a co-habitable world or polis. In response to this “falling
world” Porter shaped a modernist narrative form that melded Jamesian control, dream
state and Northern Renaissance symbolism. This narrative form has a strong ethical
imperative. As Ship of Fools above all shows, her imagination is distinctly juridical and
puts  an emphasis  on the faculty of  judgment in historical  times of  “collusion” and
“negative” evil. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ARENDT, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. New York: Viking Press,
1968. 
ARENDT, Hannah. Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.
ARENDT, Hannah. The Life of the Mind. Kindle edition, San Diego: Harcourt, 1977. 
ARENDT, Hannah. Love and Saint Augustine. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. 
ARENDT, Hannah. Responsibility and Judgment. New York: Schocken Books, 2003.
ARENDT, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.
ARENDT, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1958. 
Weimar Migrations: Katherine Anne Porter in Berlin
Transatlantica, 1 | 2018
14
BRINKMEYER JR., Robert H. Katherine Anne Porter’s Artistic Development: Primitivism, Traditionalism,
and Totalitarianism. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1993. 
GIVNER, Joan. Katherine Anne Porter: A Life. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982.
HEIDEGGER, Martin. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978. 
JOLAS, Eugene. Eugene Jolas: Critical Writings, 1924-1951. Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
2009. 
KING, Richard. Arendt and America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015. 
KRACAUER, Siegfried. From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological History of the German Film. Ed. Leonardo
Quaresima. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 
LOPEZ, Enrique H. Conversations with Katherine Anne Porter. Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1981. 
PORTER, Katherine Anne. Collected Stories and Other Writings. New York: Library of America, 2008.
PORTER, Katherine Anne. Katherine Anne Porter: Conversations. Ed. Joan Givner. Jackson: University
Press of Mississippi, 1987. 
PORTER, Katherine Anne. Katherine Anne Porter’s Poetry. Ed. Darlene Harbour Unrue. Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press, 1996.
PORTER, Katherine Anne. Letters of Katherine Anne Porter. Ed. Isabel Bayley. New York: The Atlantic
Monthly Press, 1990. 
PORTER, Katherine Anne. Selected Letters of Katherine Anne Porter: Chronicles of a Modern Woman. Ed.
Darlene Harbour Unrue. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2012. 
PORTER, Katherine Anne. Ship of Fools. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1962. 
RANSOM, John Crowe. “Criticism as Pure Speculation.” Selected Essays of John Crowe Ransom. Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984, p. 128-146.
SOLOTAROFF, Theodore. “Ship of Fools and the Critics.” Katherine Anne Porter: A Collection of
Critical Essays. Ed. Robert Penn Warren. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1979, p. 134-149. 
WARREN, Robert Penn. “Irony With a Center: Katherine Anne Porter.” Katherine Anne Porter: A
Collection of Critical Essays. Ed. Robert Penn Warren. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1979, p.
93-108.
WARREN, Robert Penn. “Notes on the Poetry of John Crowe Ransom at His Eightieth Birthday.” 
The Kenyon Review, vol. 30, no. 3 (1968), p. 319-349. 
NOTES
1. The personal bleakness of the stay is seen in Porter’s poem “Bouquet for October,” written in
Berlin, in which the author’s dispirited love for her partner (Eugene Pressly) emanates outwards
into the “bereaved branches” of autumn and into the inert “monuments” of “potbellied kings”
and “Statesmen” (Porter, 1996 93-94). 
2. The  nearest  equivalent  in  Anglo-American  modernism  to  Porter’s  writing  about  Weimar
Germany is Christopher Isherwood’s Goodbye to Berlin (1939). For Isherwood, as for fellow English
modernists W.H. Auden and Stephen Spender, Berlin embodied sexual otherness and fostered an
anti-bourgeois  frisson  that  came  through  an  encounter  with  the  late enemy.  Isherwood,
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however,  is  more of  a modernist  flâneur than is  Porter.  Despite his powerful  impressionistic
sense of the Nazi threat, he is not so concerned as she is with laying bare the “logic” of a state in
crisis. 
3. Deborah Nelson sees the “heartless” style of Arendt and McCarthy as a strategy, also found in
other mid-century women artists, that tries to confront facts through pain (Tough Enough: Arbus,
Arendt, Didion, McCarthy, Sontag, Weil [2017]). She does not include Porter in her list but she could
well have done so. 
4. Porter in interviews of the 1960s sometimes elaborated on her thesis that Weimar politicians
surreptitiously abetted the rise of Hitler. Referring to the coming to power of “these criminals—
these clowns—like Hitler,” Porter observed in 1961 that “the good people who didn’t believe in
the clowns […] still let the clowns commit the crimes good worthy people would commit if only
they had the nerve” (Porter, 1987 67). In her interviews with Hank Lopez she even places herself
in a Berlin political soiree in the winter of 1931-32 at which Goering, Goebbels and Lord Halifax
are all in attendance and where she alone voices the danger posed by the Nazis (Lopez 175-189). 
5. This focus on the marginal event is also one variant of the regional modernism of the South.
Robert Penn Warren, speaking of John Crowe Ransom, named this variant the “pastoral” or “the
dramatization of  great issues by reduction.” Where writers such as Eliot  and Pound,  Warren
observed, set forth “the crisis of culture” on a “world stage,” for southern pastoralists such as
Ransom “the great issues are most poignantly or forcefully dramatized in the local and the small”
(Warren, 1968, 326).
6. The war administration of Wilson is depicted in her story “Pale Horse, Pale Rider” (1937). In
“The Never-Ending Wrong” (1977),  her  essay  on the  Sacco and Vanzetti  case,  Porter  quoted
Nietzsche: “The state is the coldest of all cold monsters” (Porter, 2008 865).
7. In “The Wooden Umbrella” Porter attributed to Jolas a “hoarse, anxious, corrupted mysticism
speaking in a thick German accent” (Porter, 2008 560). 
8. In one of her letters from Berlin Porter mentions taking out a map of the ancient world and
tracing out Augustine’s travels on it as though her modern peregrination could be overlaid upon
his (Porter, 1990 66). 
9. This is a misunderstanding of the argument of the two women writers, who are not aesthetes.
They do use a moral criterion to gauge the absence of the moral in the evildoer.
10. In a letter sent from Berlin Porter wrote—in what could be an exposition of Rosa’s “foxy
smile”—that “Middle class virtue is a kind of code of behavior based on fear of consequences, an
artificial line set up, but to [be] sneaked over if one can manage it with secrecy” (Porter, 1990 65).
11. Kracauer says that the middle classes tried to keep up a social status that had no basis in
reality—ignoring  political  allies  in  the  working  class  who  might  have  helped  protect  liberal
democracy—and these “emotional fixations” meant that they surrendered to the Nazis (Kracauer
10, 23). Rosa as the embodiment of this “mental forlornness” has a favorite in Gehring (a proto-
Nazi) “because he fought a mensur” (Porter, 2012 485). 
12. It was Jolas who provided Porter with an introduction to the Expressionist poet Gottfried
Benn in Berlin, a meeting that fell flat because of linguistic barriers. “I went in,” Porter wrote, “in
serious hopes of saying something I wished to say, and of hearing him say certain things I had
been told he would say in a particularly interesting manner” (Porter, 2012 90). Jolas himself went
on a literary trip to Berlin in 1930, a forerunner of Porter’s own stay, and there he met Benn and
other representatives of Expressionism; like Porter he observed that political nationalism was
becoming  stronger  in  the  Depression.  Later,  when  in  Paris,  Porter  seems  to  have  distanced
herself from Jolas and he makes no reference to her in his autobiography, Man from Babel (1998). 
13. Letter to Julius S. Held, 28 April 1963, Katherine Anne Porter papers, University of Maryland. I
should like to thank Beth Alvarez for kindly supplying a copy of this letter. 
14. Kant and Augustine are aligned sources of  natality in Arendt’s  thought,  but perhaps she
never finally quite reconciled these two approaches. 
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15. In Love and Saint Augustine Arendt observes that what for Augustine determines “man” as a
“remembering being” is “natality” while what determines “man” as a desiring being is a sense of
mortality. What “ultimately stills the fear of death is not hope or desire, but remembrance and
gratitude” (Arendt, 1996 51-52).
16. Arendt’s thought about natality was developed in her Augustine book in opposition to the
prominent role of death in the thought of her mentor, Martin Heidegger. In his phenomenology
of the Weimar years Heidegger said that the self’s expectation of death could become its “own
most potentiality-for-Being” (Heidegger 294). The self can either flee this scene or it can face this
possibility resolutely. This seems like an exclusively existential drama, but in 1933 Heidegger, on
becoming a National Socialist, argued that this capacity for resolute decision should be turned
toward making a decision for the Reich. Porter, without being a reader of Heidegger, seems to
sense the role that death plays in the political ontology of Weimar existentialism, which is why
Charles’s plight at the end of “The Leaning Tower” can be seen as a critical presentation of a
Heideggerian narrative that does not lead to decision but becomes a cul-de-sac. 
ABSTRACTS
In  the  1920s  and  the  1930s  the  Texas  author  Katherine  Anne  Porter  lived  out  the  life  of  a
modernist expatriate, restlessly moving from one country to another, but it was a short trip to
Weimar Berlin between September 1931 and January 1932 that had the strongest influence on her
fiction. Porter came to feel by 1940 that her Berlin stay shaped what she called the entire “plan”
for  her  literary  output.  This  is  because  she  found  exemplified  most  starkly  in  late  Weimar
Germany the moral predicament that most of her fiction is about: a “collusion with evil” on the
part  of  supposedly  “good people.”  In  Berlin  she  witnessed  at  close  hand  the  demise  of  the
nineteenth-century liberal state and the rise of a new type of total or biopolitical state, one that
was specific to twentieth-century modernity. Her two Weimar fictions, the novel Ship of  Fools
(1962) and the long story “The Leaning Tower” (1941), attempt to find modernistic literary forms
that can represent this shift. The political element in Porter’s writing makes her transatlantic
modernism quite unlike that of the Lost Generation writers. It is more appropriate to compare
Porter’s  work  with  that  of  a  Weimar  expatriate,  Hannah  Arendt,  especially  in  their  mutual
emphasis on the thoughtlessness of evil; on the particular need for the exercise of the faculty of
judgment  in  times  of  crisis;  and  on  Saint  Augustine’s  concept  of  natality  as  a  means  for
counteracting the existential despair of interwar Europe. 
Dans  les  années  vingt  et  trente,  l’auteure  texane  Katherine  Anne  Porter  vécut  en  expatriée
moderniste, voyageant sans répit d’un pays à un autre. Mais c’est un court séjour à Berlin, de
septembre 1931 à janvier 1932, qui marqua le plus profondément son œuvre. Dès avant 1940 elle
considérait que ce voyage avait façonné ce qu’elle appelait le « plan d’ensemble » de son œuvre,
au sens où la République de Weimar chancelante était l’illustration saisissante d’un des pivots de
sa fiction : la collusion avec le mal des « braves gens ». À Berlin, Porter fut le témoin direct de la
chute de l’État libéral du XIXe siècle et de la montée en puissance d’un nouveau type d’État total,
ou biopolitique, associé à l’époque moderne. Dans les deux œuvres inspirées par ce séjour, le
roman Ship of Fools (1962) et la longue nouvelle « The Leaning Tower » (1941), Porter s’efforce
d’élaborer  des  formes  modernistes  susceptibles  de  représenter  cette  mutation.  La  dimension
politique  de  l’écriture  de  Porter  en  fait  toute  la  singularité  comparée  au  modernisme
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transatlantique des écrivains de la Génération Perdue. Il serait plus approprié de rapprocher son
œuvre de celle d’une autre expatriée de Weimar, Hannah Arendt, ne serait-ce que pour l’accent
qui y est mis sur l’insouciance du mal, sur le besoin impérieux d’exercer sa faculté de jugement
en des temps de crise et sur le recours au concept de natalité d’inspiration augustinienne pour
contrer le désespoir existentiel de l’Europe de l’entre-deux-guerres.
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